

## 9/11 and the Advent of Total Diplomacy: Strategic Communication as a Primary Weapon of War

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The 9/11 attacks were used to justify an institutional revolution meant to complete a process of integration and coordination of all the assets of US national power through a strategic communication (SC) campaign deployed on a global scale.<sup>1</sup> The “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) nurtured a narrative of crisis associated with this unprecedented public education effort. In order to sell its approaches, the United States government relied on a network of “experts”: military veterans, high-ranking officers such as Admirals as well as professional journalists and academics who contributed to forging a consensus, or, as Michel Foucault would call it, a “regime of truth” that claims a certain interpretation to be right and true, while ignoring or discrediting critics and dissenting narratives.

The authors of the present article argue that this revolutionary phase, accomplished through 9/11, is in fact the product of a few decisive formative steps that trace back to Elihu Root, a former US Secretary of War (1899-1904) who, early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, sketched the idea that any “control of foreign relations by democracies” would necessitate an engagement in “popular education.” When he later created the US Army War College, Root emphasized that the military should insert itself in the social fabric of society in order to influence policy outcomes.<sup>2</sup>

We focus here on the history of a few formative stages that rendered possible the deployment of “strategic communication,” and explain precisely how such a radical transformation operated in conjunction with the development of a counterinsurgency paradigm in the last few decades. We start by describing how the military establishment and Department of Defense (DoD) managed to edge out the State Department (DoS) in the management of Psychological operations (PSYOP) during the early Cold War; we continue by showing how a quasi-civilian network of security expertise gained covert control of these public educational programs and national security seminars, and how these broadened, unfettered by Congressional scrutiny, as a result of the Vietnam conflict<sup>3</sup>; finally we explain how 9/11 decisively pushed this “blueprint” so that the US embraced influence as a primary weapon of war, engaging in a battle of narratives and justifying its

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<sup>1</sup> The most recent: Jan Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy, Soft Power in International Relations*, New York: Palgrave, 2005; Philip Seib, *Toward a New Public Diplomacy, Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave, 2009; Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor, *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, New York: Routledge, 2009; William A. Rugh, *The practice of Public Diplomacy, Confronting Challenges Abroad*, New York, Palgrave, 2011.

<sup>2</sup> The idea of “popular diplomacy” was used in 1922 in the first issue of the journal *Foreign Affairs*, edited by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in Elihu Root, “A requisite for the success of popular diplomacy,” *Foreign Affairs*, issue 1, no. 1, 1922.

<sup>3</sup> Gordon Gray, the first General Army Officer to head the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB, 1951). In his memoir, Gray made clear that any control over the military by civilian authority was rendered very difficult by the institutional reform under H. Truman. Interview transcript by Paul L. Hopper, *Oral History records*, Columbia University, Butler Library, December 7, 1966, p. 317.

right to shape perceptions and attitudes in order to achieve information dominance or “full spectrum dominance.”<sup>4</sup>

We ask to what extent the US has succeeded in “selling” its security narrative, adopting the weapons that modern revolutionaries used in the past to target populations across frontiers.

This debate is less about an alleged militarization of civilian processes than the adoption of quasi-civilian functions by the military, using the military-academic-industrial network that has flourished over the years to serve this “total approach” towards diplomacy.<sup>5</sup> Although the issue of balance in the civil-military relation has been addressed by many scholars, few have acknowledged the social implications of this state of “no war no peace” in which paramilitary operations become the norm. The fundamental issue posed by the nature of the relationship between the academic experts and the National Security establishment remains largely unexamined until now.<sup>6</sup>

The systematic integration and coordination of all instruments of US national power were achievements that US military planners had long aspired to, and were meant to ensure survival against all types of enemy. We postulate that attempts to alter the warfare model preceded by several decades the realization of this grand scheme consequent to the 9/11 events, which functioned as the catalytic “rational” spark that precipitated this “full spectrum dominance,” i.e., a US global hegemony for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Incorporating the latest communication technologies into the US national security framework represented a “conceptual coup” that granted the US what it needed to shape its environment according to its own power structure and technologies, abandoning the outdated state-centric warfare system for a new, communication oriented, *net-centric* environment.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed by Design, the Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC*, Palo Alto CA: Stanford University Press, 1999; Lori Lyn Bogle, *The Pentagon's Battle for the American Mind*, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004; L. Fletcher Prouty, *The Secret Team, the CIA and its Allies in Control of the United States and the World*, New York: Skyhorse, 2011.

<sup>5</sup> Since the early work of Arthur A. Ekrich, *The Civilian and the Military*, 1956; followed by Sydney Lens, *Permanent War: the militarization of America*, New York: Schocken Books, 1987. The prominent role of the Pentagon in civilian diplomacy has been argued by Nicholas J. Cull, Peter Van Ham, Karen DeYoung and more specifically treated by Mark Kilbane, “Military Psychological Operations as Public Diplomacy,” in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor, *op. cit.* chapter 15; as well as by Abiodun Williams, “The US Military and Public Diplomacy” in Philip Seib, *op. cit.* chapter 11; Andrew J. Bacevich, *The New American militarism*, 2005.

<sup>6</sup> Among the authors who do raise the problem: Stephen Glain, *State vs. Defense, the Battle to Define America's Empire*, New York: Crown Publishers, 2011; Christopher Simpson, *Science of Coercion, Communication research and psychological warfare 1945-1960*, Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 1994.

<sup>7</sup> John Arquilla argued that Pearl Harbor gave the US the opportunity to perform such a “conceptual coup” shifting its strategy from Seapower to Airpower at Sea; we can find a parallel in the shift from a Command and Control Warfare paradigm (C2W) to a fourth generation warfare (4GW) or netwar, seen as a “battle of the story” relying on “influence operations” in which the military assumes a social role. John Arquilla, *Worst Enemy: The Reluctant transformation of the American military*, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2008.

## I. The birth of psychological operations

The ability to frame events and shape public perceptions has become a policy field in itself over the years drawing from the research of modern psychology. Many of the techniques of persuasion it engendered trace their origins to revolutionaries living outside the international order and eager to challenge its value system.<sup>8</sup> The founding fathers of what was to become the “science of communication” included Edward Bernays, Carl Hovland, Paul Lazarsfeld, Harold Lasswell and Wilbur Schramm, all of whom applied their social influence research to wartime propaganda efforts.<sup>9</sup>

The organization of the Committee on Public Information (CPI) during World War I was based on the military model; in the interwar period, E. Bernays, head of CPI in Latin America, defined “propaganda” as the “executive arm of the invisible government,” stressing that the human mind retains the patterns stamped on it by group influences. In decision-making, a person’s first impulse is usually to “follow the example of a trusted leader.”<sup>10</sup> It was during the Second World War that H. Lasswell pleaded for an “integration of all spheres of the government with the military.” it came to be seen that influencing people was more easily accomplished through group dynamics and the use of “social networks” than by mass media alone.<sup>11</sup> Lasswell at that time explained that “strategy” should be used to refer to the broad outlines of how diplomatic, economic, military and communication instruments had to be employed in pursuing the objectives of “Total Policy.” He believed that: “We know that the world attention structure is dominated by the message gathering and message spreading activities of a few great centers. (...) By continuing to build a non-Soviet network of specialists in international communications research it is possible to contribute to the formation of a common frame of world attention.”<sup>12</sup> Only later, in 1970, would he question the ethical implications of his work, and the placing of social scientists at the service of “institutions of war and oligarchy.”<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Paul Sharp, “Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy,” in Jan Melissen, *op. cit.* p. 106.

<sup>9</sup> Edward Bernays, *Propaganda*, New York: IG Publishing, 2005 (originally published by H. Liverlight, 1928); Harold D. Lasswell, *Democracy through public opinion*, 1941; H.D. Lasswell, “The Relation of Ideological Intelligence to Public Policy,” *Ethics*, vol. 53, no. 1, 1942, pp. 25-34; H.D. Lasswell, “Psychological policy research and total strategy,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol.16, No.4, Special Issue on International Communications Research, Winter 1952-1953, pp. 491-500; Wilbur Schramm, *The Science of Human communication*, New York, Basic Books, 1963.

<sup>10</sup> Edward Bernays, *op. cit.*, pp. 48, 73.

<sup>11</sup> Eliuh Katz, “The diffusion of new ideas and practices » in Schramm W., *The Science of human communication*, 1963, p. 80. During the Second World War, Lasswell was directing a secret research unit, inside the Library of Congress to assist the Office of War Information (OWI) see Wilson P. Dizart, *Inventing Public Diplomacy: the Story of the US Information Agency*, London, Lynne Rienner, 2004, p.20

<sup>12</sup> H. Lasswell, “Psychological Policy research and Total Strategy” in *op. cit.*, p. 498.

<sup>13</sup> See Harold Lasswell, “The Relation of Ideological Intelligence to Public Policy” in *Ethics*, no 53, vol. 1, Oct 1942, pp. 25-34; H. Lasswell “Must Science serve political power?” in *American Psychologist*, 1970, no 25, vol. 2, pp. 117-119.

A year after the adoption of the National Security Act 1947, the US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, also known as the Smith-Mundt Act, was voted into law (Public Law 80-402). The latter marked a first step by the United States towards formally managing the field of international information activities, later to be called “public diplomacy.” Under the authority of the Act, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) became responsible for overseeing “public diplomacy initiatives” abroad, independently from the State Department (DOS). The act was in fact an early demonstration of mistrust on the part of the legislative and executive branches toward the Department of State, seen as prone to Communist influence specifically, and to foreign subversion more generally.<sup>14</sup>

It was not entirely fortuitous that the Department of Defense soon after articulated the need to establish an independent board to “marshal all assets of the government, including overt information activities, to reach the US objectives.” Accordingly, The Psychological Strategy Board (PSB, April 1951) was set up to operate as such an interface between the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Defense (DOD), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Council (NSC). Its role was to formulate national policy and provide guidance, as well as to foster research.<sup>15</sup> The dominant paradigm at the time was “Psychological Operations,” an umbrella name used to describe “a systematic application, in peace and in war, by departments and agencies of the government of all elements of US national power for the attainment of fundamental national objectives.” This type of operation differed from other, more conventional means of applying power, because a): it reflected a “greater system,” and b): it emphasized effective modes of power (not formal-traditional). NSC-68/1 stated that an information program would foster the free world’s psychological resistance to Soviet aggression.<sup>16</sup> In fact, the Korean War (1950-53), followed shortly by the Indochina wars, presented an unprecedented challenge to the US government’s ability to sustainably rally public support by means of propaganda.

Although the PSB encompassed all types of cold warfare, the official discourse was that the United States, as a democratic state, could only act using “white” propaganda, meaning a communication consisting of truthful information with an unconcealed source. Yet some major US media outlets had accepted a form of quiet collaboration with the military, often through CIA operating channels, asking in chorus to use subversion as an offensive US weapon.<sup>17</sup> The group Time-

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<sup>14</sup> See Report of the Smith-Mundt Symposium, January 13, 2009. A consensus emerged that the Act should be abolished, “amended by the modern age” (William Kiehl), yet this might mean a merger of Public Diplomacy and Public Relations activities, opening potential avenues for a global scope of action.

<sup>15</sup> This was headed by Gordon Gray, a former secretary of the army. To avert bureaucratic conflict, Gray thought it unnecessary to give a precise definition of “psychological operations.” Scott Lucas, “Campaigns of truth: the psychological strategy board and American ideology, 1951-1953,” *The International History Review*, Vol.18, No.2, May 1996, pp. 279-302.

<sup>16</sup> NSC-68/1, Annex 5, “US objectives and program...” 21 Sept. 1950.

<sup>17</sup> Paul M. A. Linebarger former military intelligence during WWII authored a book: *Psychological Warfare*, Nevada, Gateways, 1948. In which he describes the work of the league of professional

Life, headed by Henry Luce, began a practice of giving publication space to military experts and consultants. In a 1949 column, Wallace Carroll wrote the following in *Life*: “We must prepare to support guerrilla warfare on such a scale as the world has never seen before.” (Later, during the Vietnam War, *Life* would publish stories under the headline “From the Files of Naval Intelligence” written with the help of the DoD.<sup>18</sup>) According to historian Parry-Giles, it is precisely around the Korean War period that a “militarization process” of the information program did in fact take place.

On September 11, 1952, the PSB's “Doctrinal Warfare Panel” met for the first time. Its priority was to find ways to target foreign elites.<sup>19</sup> Many “fronts” were quietly set up by the military through the CIA, which began to operate with the burgeoning of the “liberation movement.” The American Committee for the Liberation of the people of Russia (ACLPR), the Committee for a Free Europe (CFE), Committee for Free Asia (CFA), and the “Middle East Committee” were all officially set up as private ventures. Nonetheless, all of them were, in fact, the result of a military initiative under CIA operational guidance.<sup>20</sup> To some extent these developments bore out the remarks of Senator Edward Robertson, who, when the CIA was created on July 7, 1947, charged it with being an “invaluable asset to militarism.”<sup>21</sup>

### ***The path towards covertly influencing opinion***

Subsequent to the June 1948 NSC 10/2, regarded as insufficient by George Kennan, the NSC 68 series called for an intensification of covert operations in all fields, stepping up the role of the CIA and its Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), gradually falling under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).<sup>22</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) at this time defined psychological warfare as comprising “the planned use of propaganda and related informational measures designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviors of enemy, neutral or friendly foreign groups in such a way as to support the accomplishment of national policies and aims, or a military mission.”<sup>23</sup>

Civilian aid programs such as the Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA) soon turned into military assistance programs under the Mutual Security Agency

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propagandists such as Dr. George Gallup, Elmo Roper, Profs. Nathan Leites and Hadley Cantril centered on The American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAOPR).

<sup>18</sup> W.A. Swanberg, *Luce and his Empire*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972, p. 447.

<sup>19</sup> Shawn Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955*, London: Praeger, 2002, p. 83.

<sup>20</sup> Liam Kennedy and Scott Lucas focus on the key role of these state-private networks. See Liam Kennedy and Scott Lucas, “Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in *American Quarterly*, Vol. 57, No.2, June 2005, pp. 309-333.

<sup>21</sup> Quoted in David M. Barrett, *The CIA and Congress, the Untold story from Truman to Kennedy*, Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005, p. 22.

<sup>22</sup> Memo from Charles R. Norberg (PSB) to John Sherman (Assistant Director OPC), October 11, 1951; Minutes of meeting of PSB Ad Hoc Committee on Covert Activities, Oct 3, 1951 in PSB Series, Box 13, Truman Archives. NSC 10/2 was superseded by NSC 10/5 in October 1951 authorizing worldwide covert operations.

<sup>23</sup> Shawn Parry-Giles, *op. cit.*

(MSA, 1951-53).<sup>24</sup> The MSA, under the direction of Averell W. Harriman, Richard Bissell, and William H. Draper Jr., fostered a global influence program that served as a relay for information operations conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).<sup>25</sup>

In 1953, the same year that saw the establishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA) as the public diplomacy arm of the government, the PSB was placed under NSC supervision and subjected to a name change, becoming the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). The OCB harbored the first US Strategic Center for global propaganda, and reoriented its efforts towards a fuller privatization with an emphasis on winning domestic public opinion in order to prevail in the global contest. Certain internal PSB-OCB documents have come to light exposing how the US propaganda approach was inspired by Soviet practices. In particular, Soviet mastermind Lavrentiy Beria had evidently authored a "Handbook of Terror" that high officials thought it necessary to keep secret and out of the eyes of the public. They expected to turn the table on the Soviets and play some of their own tricks against them.<sup>26</sup> Other, less sanguinary reports refer explicitly to a need to transform the cultural patterns of target audiences.

This was also the moment at which the grand strategists sought to distance the government as much as possible from all efforts at persuasion. In March 1952, Vice Admiral Leslie C. Stevens wrote to Frank Wisner: "Possibly some of the foreign organizations that are well controlled by OPC can be used for purposes other than those for which they are established. (...) And where OPC control over foreign organization is not firm, but more in the nature of influence – such as big trade union as distinct from a wholly-owned newspaper – OPC capabilities can be expected to be greater when our objectives coincide with the objectives of such organizations."<sup>27</sup>

This evolution was in part a result of the Jackson Committee findings, which stated that psychological warfare was inseparable from other aspects of US foreign policy and needed to be better coordinated and centralized.<sup>28</sup> One of the most significant changes that the Jackson committee called for was a decrease in the use of official propaganda channels and an increase in the privatization effort.

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<sup>24</sup> In the summer 1951, the MSA had provided \$7.5 billion in foreign economic and military aid.

<sup>25</sup> Charles Hulten at the DoS was responsible for coordinating MSA activities with the USIS.

<sup>26</sup> Memo from Palmer Putnam to Gordon Gray, October 18, 1951, PSB Series, Box 11, Truman Archives, Independence.

<sup>27</sup> Memo from Vice Admiral Leslie C. Stevens to Frank Wisner, March 19, 1952, PSB series, Box 14, Truman Archives.

<sup>28</sup> Named after its chair, former CIA deputy director William Jackson. See Kenneth A. Osgood, "Words and Deeds: Race, Colonialism, and Eisenhower's propaganda war in the Third World" in Kathryn C. Statler and Anchew L. Johns, *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006, pp. 5-6; Shawn Parry-Giles, *op. cit.* p.134.

At end of the 1950s, before the USIA had become an interface between the government and the private sector, President Eisenhower thwarted an attempt to fold the it into the State Department.<sup>29</sup> Meanwhile, the CIA collaborated closely with the military establishment, securing a financial and scientific edge over the DoS. Clark Clifford, Allen Dulles, John McCone, Maxwell Taylor and others became a core around which was built a strong network of supporters, including major businesses and universities--the University of Pennsylvania, University of Illinois, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Columbia University, the University of North Carolina, Harvard, and others. This self selected elite was already developing the "new generation" war plans, namely counterinsurgency. According to Historian Amy B. Zegart, the OPC "had been transformed from a small office that conducted ad hoc political information activities to a vast organization that performed ongoing covert operations on a massive scale."<sup>30</sup> With the development of these programs, a new definition of the role and responsibility of the armed forces emerged, helping the CIA to assume new war planning functions, and allowing it to support paramilitary operations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>31</sup>

At the same time as the Soviets were denouncing the instrumentalization of so-called assistance programs for the purposes of fomenting anti-communist sedition, the massive communications effort on the part of the US ensured that no one much listened to its critics.<sup>32</sup> Psychological Warfare was a tawdry label for these activities, soon to be replaced by the more distinguished term: "Strategic International Information Operations."<sup>33</sup>

## II. The Paradigm Shift and the Defense of Counterinsurgency Warfare

The escalation of the Vietnam War during the decade following Kennedy's death in November 1963 saw a shift towards the "privatization" of public diplomacy practices. During this period, the military seemed to have succeeded in developing its own bodies of "private citizens" to help defend its policies and induce the American public to accept a protracted war. The public-private collaboration was extensive, and primarily concerned research and scientific expertise (through think tanks and book publications), as well as information and news (mainly through TV, radio broadcasts and motion pictures).

The civilian side of these Information Operations was dubbed "public diplomacy," a phrase coined by Edmund Gullion Dean of the Fletcher School of

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<sup>29</sup> Nicholas J. Cull, "How we got there" in Philip Seib, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

<sup>30</sup> Amy Zegart, *Flawed by Design, the evolution of the CIA, JCS and NSC*, Stanford, Stanford University press, 1999, p. 189.

<sup>31</sup> Defense stated that psychological warfare plans had to be in consonance with military plans and required guidance of the JCS. Navy and Air Force were providing extensive funds for outside studies in the field.

<sup>32</sup> See A.M. Rosenthal, "Vishinsky asks U.N. force U.S. to stop help to anti-reds" in *New York Times*, 23.12.51, p. 3.

<sup>33</sup> Paul M.A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, Washington DC: Gateway, 1954, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 277.

Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, contemporaneously with the establishment of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy.<sup>34</sup>

The first pamphlet produced by the Murrow Center described the practice of public diplomacy as: “the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy . . . [including] the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another . . . (and) the transnational flow of information and ideas.” Even before Gullion's use of the term public diplomacy, the concept it represents had hardly been settled,<sup>35</sup> and appeared to be largely a cover for what the government could not fit into traditional diplomacy.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore definition became ever more blurred as the USIA engaged alongside CIA programs and fronting institutions in several covert activities that escalated at the turn of the 1960s, particularly in Southeast Asia.<sup>37</sup>

### ***A civilian cover for military educational activities***

The PSB-OCB, until dismantled by President Kennedy in 1961, helped foster and finance the field of Behavioral Research. Its directors, Gordon Gray and Raymond B. Allen, had gone from and to leading university positions. Many professors and social scientists were enrolled as “paid consultants” as the military settled on a practice of allocating contracts to specific private institutions.<sup>38</sup> The RAND Corporation, originally organized by the Air Force in 1946, had become an independent not-for-profit organization two years later, with Hans Speier (“The future of psychological warfare,” 1952) as chief of its social science division.<sup>39</sup> The Council for the Defense of Freedom (CDF, 1951), the Foreign Policy Research

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<sup>34</sup> Murrow died at age 57 in April 1965 after heading the United States Information Agency from 1961-1964.

<sup>35</sup> The concepts that predate the term are those of popular diplomacy, followed by citizen diplomacy, initiated by President Eisenhower. The White House summit on Citizen Diplomacy in 1956 led to the establishment of People-to-people International. Similar summits were reinstated in July 2006 and February 2008.

<sup>36</sup> According to M. Baldyga, when Edmund Gullion minted the term “public diplomacy” he was trying to bring into one phrase all the activities of the United States’ public-private governmental interactions with the world. See Panel 1, 2009 Smith-Mundt Symposium, history of the Smith-Mundt Act, January 13, 2009, p. 17.

<sup>37</sup> Garry S. Messinger, *The Battle for the Mind*, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 2010, pp. 162, 177.

<sup>38</sup> Prof. Frederick Barghoorn (Yale University); Walter Rostow (Center for International Studies, MIT, Boston); Samuel L. Sharp (American University); William Phillips (School of Advanced International Studies, Washington D.C.); Bryce Wood (Social Science Research Council); Arthur Whitaker (University of Pennsylvania); John Gardner (Vice President of Carnegie Corp.) Herbert Hyman (Columbia University, NY); Gabriel Almond (Princeton, Center for Research in International Relations.); Henry Kissinger (Harvard, Boston) to name a few examples of what Irving Louis Horowitz called “The civilian militarists” in Sidney Lens, *Permanent war: The militarization of America*, New York, Schocken Books, 1987, p.49.

<sup>39</sup> Set up to establish an arsenal of ideas to help cope with national security problems. See Saul Friedman, “The Rand Corporation and our policy makers,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 1963, pp. 61-68.



Institute (FPRI, 1955) at the University of Pennsylvania, the National Strategy Information Center (NSIC, 1962) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, 1962) were but a few examples of the civil-military symbiosis.

The concepts of “protracted conflict” and “counterinsurgency warfare” were scientifically developed at these national security centers. In fact, many “psychological operations” (PSB/OCB) were elaborated under the guidance of their psychologists and social scientists. Meanwhile, “counterinsurgency” was defined as: “the technique of using, in appropriate combination, all elements of National Power in support of a friendly government which is in danger of being overthrown by an active communist campaign.”<sup>40</sup>

The correspondence of some of these experts is an invaluable resource in attempting to understand this relationship between private industry and the military, none more so than that of FPRI deputy director Colonel William Kintner, an active Army officer assigned to the Plans Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

The first National Military-Industrial conference took place in March 1955, sponsored by the defense industry and the various branches of the Armed Forces. A permanent year-round program was instituted in 1959 at the National War College in Washington. Under the presidency of Frank R. Barnett, the FPRI supplied the substance of the program for the Institute for American Strategy (IAS), whose objective was to awaken the public to the “all-encompassing nature of the Soviet-Communist challenge.” Barnett later assumed the presidency of the NSIC.

The strategy seminars were authorized by the JCS and sponsored by the IAS, funded by the CIA through the Richardson Foundation. The third iteration of these was held in Pittsburgh on 15 April 1961 on the topic of “Fourth Dimensional Warfare.” During the session, Col. Kintner, speaking as chief of long range planning for the US Army, advocated an “integrated national strategy” based on military power to “turn back communism and extend the frontiers of freedom.”

In essence, these foreign policy institutes functioned as communication bridges. A few years later F. Barnett's letters would share their achievements with Col. Kintner: “We have now established a nation-wide distribution net for (a) books, films and other educational materials relating to Communist Affairs and (b) the brochures and program outlines of responsible groups meeting the challenge.”

We do have effective constituents among 12 trade associations, 3000 clergymen, 85 University scholars, 2000 high school teachers, 4000 lawyers, 75 editors and publishers, and 2000 National War College reserve alumni with and for whom we have organized

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<sup>40</sup> See Fletcher Prouty, *op. cit.* p. 476. Prouty served as the chief of special operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Kennedy years.

forums on national security and Communism.”<sup>41</sup> In another piece of correspondence, Barnett did nothing to conceal his pride regarding the level of cooperation between the war colleges and the private sector, writing: “We don’t want to impose on the Admirals; but once or twice a year it may be feasible to “advertise” our national security product with their help, especially before audiences of top businessmen and bankers.”<sup>42</sup>

The role of CSIS merits further study. Created by Chief of Naval operations Admiral Arleigh Burke, it was co-chaired by Richard V. Allen, the future National Security Adviser to Ronald Reagan.<sup>43</sup> Admiral Burke spoke out repeatedly against civilians' attempts to dictate the course of military strategy in Vietnam.<sup>44</sup> Most of the money financing CSIS came from conservative philanthropic organizations and foundations. The biggest donors were the ultra conservative Scaife foundation, and Prince Turki bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia. After its foundation CSIS had instituted a “Middle East project” as well as a “Near East project.” In 1967 it issued a major study on Islamic fundamentalism, soon to become a prominent topic under the leadership of Walter Laqueur (Chairman of the Research Council), a former emigrant from Germany who, after having been a leading anti-communist expert, became a leading specialist on “international terrorism.”

The USIA collaboration with the CIA in the publishing industry was channeled through an entity called Operations and Policy Research Inc. (OPR) whose board of directors included Harold Lasswell, then President of the American Political Science Association. This provided a cover through which it could secure outside assistance unfettered by official connections.<sup>45</sup>

Senators George McGovern and J. William Fulbright were the most vocal critics of these manipulations, and of those who were using the “tactics of fear” to promote worst-case scenarios.<sup>46</sup> In the spring of 1961, Senator Fulbright read a memo to the Congressional Record denouncing this civilian veneer of the military establishment.<sup>47</sup> The move led to a frontal collision between J. W.

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<sup>41</sup> Letter from F. Barnett to William R. Kintner, 21 September 1966, in Kintner Papers, Box 6, Hoover Institute, Stanford CA.

<sup>42</sup> Letter from F. Barnett to Omar Pace, 17 September 1966, in Kintner Papers, Box 6, Hoover Institute, Stanford CA.

<sup>43</sup> Arleigh Burke was also the president of the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation, formed in July 1964 to finance Radio Free Asia, which started its activities on 15.08.1966. See Marie McNair, “The Admiral never took down the flag,” *The Washington Post*, 03.08.64.

<sup>44</sup> *The Evening Star*, 10.07.64.

<sup>45</sup> From 1967 on, USIA financed the OPR’s unpublicized contracts. The first book was *Target: The World*, edited by Evron Kirkpatrick, and published by McMillan, 1965; Kirkpatrick, was a former member of the State Department’s Office of Intelligence research, and the husband of Jeanne Kirkpatrick, who published *Strategy of Deception: A Study of Worldwide communist tactics*, New York: Farrar Strauss and Co., 1964.

<sup>46</sup> *The Washington Post*, 10.05.71, p. 13.

<sup>47</sup> This included various projects such as “Project Alert” financed and supported by the Navy League of the United States. See Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, *The politics of unreason, Right-Wing extremism in America, 1790-1970*, New York: Harper & Row, 1970, p. 314.

Fulbright, backed by J. F. Kennedy, and Strom Thurmond (R.-South Carolina), supported by the military cadre.<sup>48</sup>

Despite Kennedy's backing of Senator Fulbright in public, the Kennedy administration was, more discreetly, supportive of CIA-backed counterinsurgency operations that utilized the USIA and its popular head, Edward R. Murrow, appointed by Kennedy ostensibly for his gold standard reputation in wartime international broadcasting and American journalism. Directed by the Kennedy White House, Murrow's USIA participated in counterinsurgency courses through the Foreign Service Institute and the U.S. Army Special Warfare School in Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. As the agency responsible for chairing the Psychological Coordinating Committee for Laos and Vietnam, the USIA became heavily involved with applying counterinsurgency doctrine to Southeast Asia, serving as a member of the Counterinsurgency Committee Special Group headed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Maxwell Taylor in charge of all the planning of covert actions in the region.<sup>49</sup> Murrow's USIA was also the propaganda sponsor for US-backed South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem.<sup>50</sup> Despite his background in traditional journalism, Murrow fully embraced his role as a government propagandist.

From the end of the 1960s until the mid-1970s, a series of disclosures focused on the "Pentagon Papers" revealed, though only partially, how the CIA and the military had dissimulated in their influence campaign by camouflaging it with these private bodies, thus avoiding legislative oversight. The Church and Otis-Pike Commissions that were set up to shed light on these activities failed to fully expose the working mechanisms of this scheme and prevented any dismantling of the structures of this civil-military apparatus, which merely waited patiently for Reagan to reinstate them.<sup>51</sup>

Although the Vietnam War was revealed to be an open failure in terms of Information Operations, the amount of effort expended in attempting to influence world public opinion was unparalleled. Because "counterinsurgency" was a paramilitary area of operation, it required the closest coordination of

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<sup>48</sup> Young professor Gabriel Kolko would become one of the academics leading the charge to cut ties between the DoD and Universities. See Will Lissner, "U. of Pennsylvania drops secret research for U.S.," *New York Times*, 05.11.1966, p. 1, 3; *Senate Congressional Record*, 11.08.61, p. 14448.

<sup>49</sup> In October 1964, Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson viewed counterinsurgency (COIN) as "the major mission in foreseeable future" in Ann Marlowe, "Afghanistan: America's war of perception" in *Policy Review*, no 167, June-July 2011, pp.19-35. General Taylor later became president of the Institute for Defense Analysis (1966-1969) at about the same period he was a Special Consultant to the President and Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (1965-1969).

<sup>50</sup> "Murrow at the USIA," Digital Collections and Archives, The Murrow Center, Tufts University, <http://dca.lib.tufts.edu/features/murrow/exhibit/usia.html>

<sup>51</sup> James W. McCord, a lieutenant colonel in the Air Force, CIA and FBI officer testified in front of the Senate Watergate Committee that the White House had been trying since 1971 to get political control over the CIA assessments and estimates in order to make them conform to policy objectives. This meant that intelligence products could then be forced to accord the DoD needs, future weapons needs, and would give the illegal tactics a national security cover.

political, economic, psychological and military actions. The USIA's deep involvement in psychological warfare operations during the Vietnam War presupposed that it target not only foreign but domestic audiences.

The clash between Fulbright and the military over the conflation of civilian and military activities continued for at least a decade, with former CIA Director, Senator William H. Jackson, acting as Fulbright's principal adversary. Fulbright, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wanted to shield culture from information activities, and openly criticized what he viewed as a "salesman" mentality. He espoused democracy by example instead of indoctrination. For him, the "hard-sell" had been, and remained, counterproductive.<sup>52</sup>

As the Vietnam War ended, the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), originally formed in 1950 as a private citizens committee, was reformed (1976).<sup>53</sup> It was added to the several dozen similar organizations coordinated by the American Security Council (ASC), a kind of central committee to the military-academic-industrial network, composed predominantly of retired high military officers, such as Admirals Radford, Stevens and William C. Mott.<sup>54</sup> Following the war, the boundaries between military and civilian activities became more blurred than ever.

### ***Shaping the new international terrorism paradigm***

As soon as the Vietnam withdrawal negotiations were concluded, civil-military think tanks rushed to publicize their research examining the preceding decade, claiming that American security no longer rested on the defense of territory. The notion of security itself was definitively altered. The major function of the military, as Samuel P. Huntington expressed it, was no longer to deter aggression, but to support diplomacy. As a new prophet as well as a Pentagon consultant, he claimed that the strategic concept of the next decade had to be defined by the work of the military.<sup>55</sup> An elite group that included Paul Nitze, Eugene and Walt Rostow, James Schlesinger and Richard V. Allen, all of whom were members of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) after 1976,

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<sup>52</sup> J. William Fulbright published a book entitled *The Pentagon Propaganda machine* (1970) in which he noted that since the mid 1960s, the military had expanded its civilian propaganda activities. See Garry S. Messinger, *op. cit.* p. 180.

<sup>53</sup> The Committee on the Present Danger, founded by Paul Nitze, a former secretary of the Navy, deputy secretary of defense and drafter of NSC-68 was soon to become very influential in the public debate. The original CPD was headed by James B. Conant and boasted former head of the OSS (former CIA) William J. Donovan as a member.

<sup>54</sup> "The Foreign Policy Research Institute" in *Remparts*, August 1966, pp. 39-40. See also the Draft written by Frank R. Barnett, titled: "Council for the common Defense," Nov 25, 1969 that detail all the initiatives and grass roots components of the "public information network." Folder Barnett 1968-69, Kintner Papers, box 6, Hoover Institute, Stanford CA.

<sup>55</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "After containment: The functions of the military establishment," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 406, The Military and American Society, Mar. 1973, pp. 1-16. The US Combat Development Command (CDC, 1970) entitled "Man and the 1990 environment" predicted that in the future "the major portion of the army's effort (would be) devoted to an accomplishment of quasi-civilian functions." Quoted in Peter Watson, *War on the Mind: the Military uses and abuses of Psychology*, New York, Basic Books, 1978.

warned that inertia and passivity in the field of National Defense and the lack of investment in new warfare doctrines would lead to growing instability and insecurity.<sup>56</sup>

A former Army Intelligence officer during World War II, Henry Kissinger, who had been picked out by Nelson Rockefeller while Cold War advisor to Eisenhower, gradually became a shining star under presidents Nixon and Ford. Acting as National Security Adviser and Secretary of State, Kissinger became a member of all prominent military-academic centers, and a pivotal figure in laying out the framework for responding to “international terrorism” with a War-Terror-Crime discourse.<sup>57</sup> As such, he contributed to setting up a National Center to Combat Terrorism (NCCT) within the DOS in December 1974, and managed, with the help of John Schlesinger, to force the issue of a transformation of the intelligence apparatus.<sup>58</sup> By marginalizing the function of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), seen as an obstacle to freedom of action by the executive branch, and more specifically the Pentagon, Kissinger furthered a process already underway, namely the politicization of “intelligence.”<sup>59</sup>

The “framing” of terrorism in terms of an “international conspiracy” between 1972 and 1976 was rendered feasible through a mobilization of all these assets. The military had improved its capacity to lobby Congress, to overwhelm its opponents, and to draw favor for its new “network centric” doctrines, tailored for a “deterritorialized” approach to security with RAND and CSIS as the core institutions responsible for this gradual redesign of public diplomacy. Frank M. Stanton, chairman of the RAND board of trustees and president of CBS, directed the committee responsible for redesigning the information program after Vietnam (Stanton Panel, 1975).<sup>60</sup>

The phenomenon of “Terrorism Studies,” monopolized by experts, fed the general as well as the official policy discourse, and eventually built a consensus in the form of a unified approach, underway well before Ronald Reagan’s ascent to power in 1980.<sup>61</sup> Three years earlier, Yonah Alexander had started to edit a journal called *Terrorism*, a year before Walter Laqueur, in his *Terrorism Reader*, established a grand narrative of political violence.<sup>62</sup> Laqueur was one of those who advocated resorting to violence and covert actions against terrorists (*The Age of Terrorism*, 1987). The Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism

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<sup>56</sup> The CPD had three co-chairmen: Henry H. Fowler, Lane Kirkland, David Packard. Eugene V. Rostow, Chairman of the Exec. Comm; Paul H. Nitze, Chairman of Policy Studies. General Counsel Max M. Kampelman, Exec. committee : Richard V. Allen, Edmund Gullion, Rita E. Hauser, Charles Burton Marshall, John P. Roche, Dean Rusk, Richard J. Wahlen.

<sup>57</sup> Joseph Campos, *The State and Terrorism*, 2007, p. 33.

<sup>58</sup> Dr. Lewis Hoffacker led this body.

<sup>59</sup> Under President Ford, Kissinger and the Presidential Foreign Advisory Board (PFIAB) convinced the President to engage an outside team, team-B, to challenge CIA intelligence estimates. The office of national estimate (ONE) was closed down.

<sup>60</sup> The Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy endorsed the recommendations of the Stanton Panel to restructure USIA. PL 92-325, The report was issued June 28, 1975: <http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/20213.pdf>

<sup>61</sup> Jason Franks, *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism*, New York: Palgrave, 2006.

<sup>62</sup> John Collins, and Ross Glover, *Collateral Language: A user’s guide to America’s New War*, 2002, p. 178.

(JCIT) in the summer of 1979 contributed to establishing the ideological foundation of the future war on terrorism.

It bears note that the issue of terrorism, as it was defined, was in some ways the fulfillment of a demand coming from the cold warriors and the National Security establishment; they were looking for ways to bypass legislative restrictions placed on the freedom of executive action after Vietnam.<sup>63</sup>

### ***Ronald Reagan and the Strategic Communication offensive***

According to former USIA officials, the Reagan administration, under neoconservative influence, tried harder than any of its predecessors to convert the agency into a partisan ideological weapon. The double Iranian-Afghan crisis in 1979-1981 revived US security commitments to an area spanning from the Persian Gulf to South-East Asia. Ronald Reagan, building on Nixon and Kissinger's preparatory work, undertook a strategy to market discourse about the defense of the free world against "international terrorism." The issue not only became the central point of his domestic policy, but the focus of an international campaign of persuasion, or "truth projection." The experts were central to this effort. Organized as informal networks, they provided guidance for leadership, helping to coordinate the communication effort and make it cohesive and consistent for a global audience.

Public diplomacy and the USIA were placed at the service of these objectives. Under Charles Z. Wick, the USIA extended its ties with the CIA and the Pentagon.<sup>64</sup> Jeremiah Denton (R-Alabama), who chaired the hearings of the 1981 to 1986 Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism (SST), laid the foundations in Congress of what, according to historian Gold-Biss, became the "conspiracy theory argumentation," creating the illusion of a "seamless web of violence" against the West. So-called experts such as Claire Sterling, Arnaud de Borchgrave, and Robert Moss, still very much active today, crafted the narrative of "terror as an international conspiracy."<sup>65</sup> The National Security Decision Directive NSDD77 (January, 1983) explained that US public diplomacy was meant to counter Soviet "active measures," a term denoting covert and deceptive operations in support of Soviet foreign policy, and the new special planning group for public diplomacy (SPG), now under NSC authority, sounded suspiciously like a rebirth of the OCB. A year later NSDD 130 stated the Overall objective: "International information is an integral and vital part of US national security policy and strategy in the broad sense. Together with other components of public diplomacy, it is a key strategic instrument for shaping fundamental political and ideological trends around the globe on a long-term basis and ultimately affecting the behavior of governments."<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Eric Hershberg and Kevin W. Moore, *Critical Views of September 11: Analyses from Around the World*, 2002, p. 48.

<sup>64</sup> The Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, headed by Leonard L. Silverstein, stated that public diplomacy was indispensable to US national security and, wisely used, could lessen the possibility of military conflict. See R.T. Arndt, *The first resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, 2005, p. 527.

<sup>65</sup> Michael Gold-Biss, *The Discourse on Terrorism: Political violence and the SST, 1981-1986*, 1994.

<sup>66</sup> Dated March 6, 1984 at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2213t.gif>

The single individual who best personifies this strategy is Ray Cline. A high-ranking member of the CIA from 1949 to 1966, he then moved to the CSIS. Regularly interviewed by the media, he contributed to articles and books such as *Terrorism, the Soviet Connection*, with Yonah Alexander (1984).<sup>67</sup> Together, they shaped a perception that the Soviet Union was behind a formidable conspiracy of terror. Another prominent expert is Anthony H. Cordesman, who currently holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He was a prominent media source during the First Gulf War's Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. Cordesman is the author of dozens of books on terrorism and national security and is a recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal.<sup>68</sup>

More study should be devoted to the US government response in the field of information operations to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Council for the Defense of Freedom, created in 1951 for the purpose of helping mobilize resistance to communist aggression in Korea, under the name of the Council Against Communist Aggression, generated a new affiliate: "The Committee for a Free Afghanistan" (CFA, 1981). The CFA headquarters shared a building with the conservative Heritage foundation, which was busy investing immeasurable effort and funds in order to shape public perceptions of security and counterterrorism, exploiting as much as it could the instrument of public surveys.<sup>69</sup>

The CFA's executive director in 1981 was Karen McKay, a former major in the US Army. CFA's activities included an extensive information program that included a weekly newsletter, monitoring communist Afghans, identifying Soviet violations of human rights and financing humanitarian projects, including treatment of victims in US hospitals. According to its own strategic plan, CFA was "the only major organization working on all major fronts to mobilize public opinion in America, and in the rest of the free world, in support of the Afghan fighters."<sup>70</sup> On February 16th, 1983, six of them met privately with President Reagan in the Oval Office, a meeting arranged by the CFA.<sup>71</sup> The liaison with the US government was made possible through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED, 1983), an independently created program that boasted as board members no less than

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<sup>67</sup> Yonah Alexander is now Director of the International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS). In a recent op-ed co-authored with Dr. Milton Hoenig for the *Jerusalem Post*, he warns that Al Qaeda is motivated to avenge the death of Osama Bin Laden and could aspire to strike with a nuclear device. Published at: <http://www.potomacinstitute.org/> on 16.08.2011.

<sup>68</sup> <http://csis.org/program/burke-chair-counterinsurgency>

<sup>69</sup> The head of the presidentially appointed Commission for Public Diplomacy, the oversight body for USIA, was Edwin Feulner, Jr., president of the (Scaife-funded) Heritage foundation. See Steven Livingston, *The Terrorism Spectacle*, San Francisco CA: Westview Press, 1994, p. 161. According to Livingston it appeared that the Heritage Foundation, in its effort to influence the FBI guidelines, was declaring war on any and all dissent from official policy.

<sup>70</sup> "A Strategy plan to defeat Soviet aggression," CFA, January 1983.

<sup>71</sup> José Desloge, "Free Afghanistan Report," *The Committee for a free Afghanistan*, no. 5, May 1983. Movies were produced by the USIA featuring actor Kirk Douglas from 1982 to 1984, with titles such as: "Thanksgiving in Peshawar," "Afghanistan in the Hidden War." See Nicholas J. Cull, "Film as public diplomacy: the USIA's cold war at twenty-four frames per second," in Kenneth Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge (ed.), *The United States and Public Diplomacy, new directions in cultural and international history*, 2010, p. 279.

Kissinger, Lane Kirkland, president of the AFL-CIO, and Dante Fascell, head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.<sup>72</sup>

The independent "Committee for the Free World" (CFW, 1981), chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, was advocating a similarly ambitious calendar to the CFA. In its April 1986 Newsletter, the CFW declared: "We have the opportunity to let the brave mujahideen of Afghanistan know that their incredible resistance to the Soviets is not vain, that it is not the end but the beginning."<sup>73</sup>

The experts from all these ostensibly non-governmental institutions-- Cordesman, Burke, Cline, Possony, Alexander, Kissinger and many others-- managed to create extensive informal networks, providing guidance for leadership and helping to coordinate the communication effort, shaping an official narrative on "international terrorism" and making it cohesive and consistent for a global audience. All of the para-state institutions, and most notably the CSIS, provided convenient "cover" for services to three primary groups: first of all to the major media, by creating instant access to former officials who were presumed to have inside information; second, to the government, by conducting semi-official activities that would be publicly embarrassing if conducted by government; and, third, to the CIA and the military by providing support for "friendly experts" who could thus channel their views through the mainstream media.

On May 17, 1984 Senator Jesse Helms, who would later be instrumental in the dissolution of the USIA in 1999, introduced a member of the Knesset to the U.S. Senate floor, Mr. Michael Kleiner. Kleiner's argument was that the future security of Israel was intimately related to the strength of the United States as the leader of the free world. He explained to the Senate members that: "Soviet sponsored terrorism and Soviet backed revolutionary guerrilla movements were creating an environment in which Israel is unable to survive." Kleiner was pleading for the alliance between Israeli and American conservatives, to defend themselves against the enemies of freedom (in the Middle East).<sup>74</sup>

Mere months before the sudden Soviet collapse, Ray Cline was alerting the public to Gorbachev's alleged hidden agenda in the Middle East. If the Department of State's annual report on "patterns of global terrorism" rarely mentioned Islamic terrorist groups between 1983 and 1990, three weeks after the Iraq incursion into Kuwait in August 1990, Bruce Hoffman, a RAND terrorist expert, announced nothing less than that the center of international terrorism had shifted from Moscow to Baghdad.<sup>75</sup> In the meantime, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Act

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<sup>72</sup> NED was legally a private, not-for-profit organization funded by Congress through the USIA. It had four core institutions: the Center for International private enterprise, the free trade union institute, and the International Republican institute. See David K. Shieler, "US Aid for Global pluralism," *New York Times*, 01.08.86, pp. 1, 16.

<sup>73</sup> "Culture War II," *The Nation*, 18 April 1981, p. 42.

<sup>74</sup> Congressional Record Senate, 17 May, 1984, S5911.

<sup>75</sup> Beau Grosscup, *The Newest Explosions of terrorism*, Farhills, N.J., New Horizon Press, 1998, p.387



(1986) proposed to further unify the military while giving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff more influence on the policy process.<sup>76</sup>

### **The End of the Cold War and the Shift toward the corporate model**

At the end of the Cold War, the State Department seemed to gradually lose ground in its attempts to lead foreign policy initiatives. The rapid collapse of the Soviet Union offered new opportunities for a “corporate” offensive, and for the multibillion dollar security industries as the agenda was soon to turn to the question of “political Islam” after the World Trade Center Attack in early 1993.<sup>77</sup>

These first attempted assaults on one of the Towers posed a serious challenge to the official story that would later be promoted. As some authors and independent inquirers have already explained, the main culprit, Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, was himself a CIA asset, while other alleged key organizers were FBI informants. Not only that, the FBI helped to provide the explosives.<sup>78</sup>

Meanwhile, following these attacks, in 1994, the International Broadcast Act reorganized the USIA into four bureaus, with a decisive shift toward the private sector. The leading offensive was to be in Egypt, and aimed at developing an epicenter for a future and much anticipated technological revolution through proponents of modernization within Mubarak’s entourage.<sup>79</sup>

Republican Senator Jesse Helms, acting as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1995-2001), was the key broker of this transition. The usual critics kept targeting the State Department’s alleged inability to prioritize its current and long-term goals.<sup>80</sup> In 1997, Paul Wolfowitz, with Donald Rumsfeld, chartered the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), calling for the pursuit of US global leadership and a remaking of the Middle East.<sup>81</sup> The document bespeaks its origin in a moment of unilateralism and triumphalism due to the US Cold War victory.

At the institutional level, another phenomenon was taking place simultaneously. Beginning under the Reagan-Bush presidency, a proliferation, which further weakened the DoS, of political appointees at levels below under-secretary was

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<sup>76</sup> The implementation of the Act is an ongoing project, pleading for the integration of forces also called jointness, carried on in Joint Vision 2010 (1996) and Joint Vision 2020 (2000)

<sup>77</sup> Revolving around Edward Djerdjian’s speech at Meridian House, in Washington D.C., June 2, 1992.

<sup>78</sup> Ahmed Nafeez Mosaddeq, *War on truth, 9/11 Disinformation and the anatomy of terrorism*, Northampton, MA: Olive Branch press, 2002, pp. 34-38.

<sup>79</sup> Nivien Saleh, *Third World Citizens and the information technology revolution*, New York, Palgrave, 2010.

<sup>80</sup> Johnson Chalmers, *Nemesis: The last days of the American Republic*, New York, Metropolitan Books, 2006, p. 117. Whether or not this played into the hand of the military after 9/11 is uncertain; the abolition of USIA certainly gave more latitude to the Pentagon though. J. Helms received the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, the highest award given to noncareer federal employees, on October 30, 2002.

<sup>81</sup> The original idea was contained in P. Wolfowitz “Blue print” of 1993, leaked to the Press, which argued for the protection of the new order and U.S. military dominance.

taking place. Professional Foreign Service Officers were replaced with “clients,” establishing a practice of political patronage and greater obedience.<sup>82</sup>

By the end of the Clinton presidency, the whole apparatus had been delocalized toward the private-corporate sector, in which the Pentagon was playing an active part through its quasi-civilian network, boosted in the previous decade by the SDI and other anti-missile defense projects. According to Helen Laville: “The USIA may have expired in 1999, but its demise, far from signaling the end of Kennan’s concept of political warfare, opened the way to a more diverse and more aggressive system, with ventures based in the White House (The Office of Global Communication) and the Pentagon (the Office of Special Plans) sometimes complementing, sometimes challenging, those emanating from the DoS or the CIA.”<sup>83</sup>

Contrary to prevailing assumptions that the USIA was sacrificed at the end of the nineties, evidence suggests rather that the USIA was simply not tailored for the new network environment.<sup>84</sup>

In April 1999, PDD-68 mandated the creation of an International Public Information Co-ordinating Group (IPICG), bringing together representatives from all major agencies (DoS, DoD, JCS, USAID, NSC) to coordinate information activities.<sup>85</sup> The vision contained in this document is probably as revolutionary as was NSC-68 at the time of its creation in April 1950, and as ambitious: it tried to harness the enormous potential of the US government to plan, coordinate, and implement “strategic influence” campaigns to garner support for its worldwide policies. It is significant that the DoD was the agency that developed and provided the draft of the national IPI strategy to the DoS. Six months later, the USIA was well on its way to being dismantled as an agency, and its remains were buried in the DoS.<sup>86</sup> USAID would remain a prominent channel for strategic influence in the following decades, pushed to the front lines during the War on Terror.<sup>87</sup> That same year the Secretary of Defense claimed that in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s *Joint Vision 2010* the transformation of the military was underway to assure information superiority and battlefield dominance for decades to come.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> David Corn, “A Look at the State of State,” *The Washington Post*, 10.01.1993, p. 1.

<sup>83</sup> Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford, *The US government, citizen groups and the Cold war: the State-Private network*, New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 11.

<sup>84</sup> See the seminal work of RAND experts John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars*, National defense Research Institute, RAND, 2001. The concept of cyberwar (1993) and netwar (1996) were elaborated in their book *In Athena’s Camp*, 1997.

<sup>85</sup> Publicly available information about the IPICG is limited and the directive remains classified. The White House National Security Strategy for a New Century, December 1999 endorsed PDD68 and the IPI structure. See N. J. Cull, “How we get there” *op. cit.*, p. 42.

<sup>86</sup> Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on managed information dissemination, Office of the under secretary of Defense for acquisition, Technology and logistics, Washington, October 2001.

<sup>87</sup> See the testimony of Jeffrey Grieco, Assistant Administrator for legislative and Public Affairs, at USAID, quoted in the Smith-Mundt Symposium report, January 13, 2009, p. 9.

<sup>88</sup> William S. Cohen, Message of the Secretary of Defense at <http://www.dod.gov/execsec/adr1999/msg.html/>

Three years prior to 9/11, Barry Fulton, under CSIS patronage, concluded his book *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age* with: "The time has come to bring US diplomatic readiness to the standard set by the Pentagon."<sup>89</sup>

A few months prior to the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, a CSIS publication entitled "To Prevail" stated that: "the State Department's culture devalues public diplomacy."<sup>90</sup> Its author asserted that the private sector's participation should be developed, as should covert activities for the improvement of intelligence capacity.

### III. The advent of total diplomacy after 9/11

9/11 opened a decisive phase of U.S. institutional reforms, fitting and reflecting preexisting "frames of reference" and "narratives" shaped over the preceding decades. According to the psychological warfare paradigm, one of the primary goals of the terrorist attacks on the US was to influence perceptions and alter the behavior of one or more target audiences. As Gary L. Whitley stated in 2000: "Technological developments make it possible to subject all people, from ordinary citizens to strategic leaders, heads of state, or military leaders, to a complex PSYOP offensive," the main task of which is to overwhelm the audience through the use of terror tactics.

The way the attacks of the planes were synchronized produced a "total" impact on the audience, too suddenly overwhelmed to engage in a reflection on the underlying reasons for such extraordinary events.<sup>91</sup> Theoretically, at least, the amplitude of the attacks could have diminished the need for the US government to "sell" its counterterrorism effort.<sup>92</sup> As psychologists have shown, the use of this type of moral judgment not only makes the enemy appear more dangerous, but such judgments, by their intuitive and emotional nature, inhibit conscious interference and reasoning.<sup>93</sup>

US public diplomacy's first initiative after 9/11 was a successful information campaign to link the attack first to Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, then to Iraq and Saddam Hussein. The effort was led on three fronts: by the Pentagon, the Council on Foreign Relations, and by the private security think-tanks.<sup>94</sup> Overall, these efforts were fueled by the new military doctrines of "Information

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<sup>89</sup> Barry Fulton, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the information age*, CSIS panel reports, 1998.

<sup>90</sup> Kurt Campbell, *To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism*, CSIS, 2001.

<sup>91</sup> Gary L. Whitley, "PSYOP Operations in the 21st century," US Army War College, Strategy Research Project, 2000, p. 10.

<sup>92</sup> A. Axelrod, *Selling the Great War, the making of American propaganda*, 2009, p. 217.

<sup>93</sup> Peter Liberman, "An Eye for an Eye: Public support for war against evildoers," *International Organization*, vol. 60, no.3, Summer 2006, p. 692; Bruce Bongar, *op. cit.*

<sup>94</sup> David Hoffman, "Beyond public diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 2, March-April 2002; Leonard Mark, "Diplomacy by other means," *Foreign Policy*, no. 132, Sept.-Oct. 2002; Peter G. Peterson, "Public Diplomacy and the war on terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, Sept-Oct 2002, pp. 74-94.

Operation” (IO) and “Strategic Communication” (SC).<sup>95</sup> These were often equated to public diplomacy, defined as: “Focused US Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of US Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.”<sup>96</sup>

The rhetoric of war, as it has since developed, instantiates a specific unidimensional scale of values that effaces the complexity of these phenomena, marginalizing any attempt to question the official narrative.<sup>97</sup> William Bennett’s *Why we Fight* (2002) was a reiteration of Daniel Pipes’ thesis on the subversive actions of Islam, alleged to threaten the security of the United States. Bennett stated that: “There is no question that Islam is at war with the West and specifically with America.”<sup>98</sup> Scores of others publications were founded on the “Good vs. Evil” rhetoric and rested entirely on official sources, such as Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding’s *Masterminds of Terror* (2003); David Cortright and George A. Lopez’s *Uniting against Terror* (2007), Ronald Kessler’s *The Terrorist Watch* (2007) and Lee Hamilton, Bruce Hoffman, Brian Jenkins’ *State of the Struggle: Report on the Battle Against Global Terrorism* (2007), to name just a few.<sup>99</sup> Almost all attacked “unpatriotic” dissidence, equated with “Anti-Americanism,” a charge leveled at targets including liberal media, the ACLU and leftist intellectuals.

As the National Security document NSS2002 claimed, there was now a single model for national success, valid for everyone. Anti-Americanism soon became the imputed rationale as well as a convenient label for anyone who criticized the policies described above. The US government had no intention of re-examining the veracity or falseness of its underlying assumptions, notably the one stating that terrorism is by definition an evil conspiracy against the West.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2020 (2000) and DoD Information Roadmap (2003) regard Information Operations as a military core competency with the social networking sites considered as holding particular power for IO.

<sup>96</sup> DoD, 2006, cited in “Foundations of effective influence operations, a framework for enhancing Army capabilities,” RAND, RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine and Resources Program, 2009.

<sup>97</sup> McCauley Clark, “War versus Justice in response to terrorist attacks, competing frames of and their implications,” in Bruce Bongar, *Psychology of Terrorism*, 2006, pp. 56, 62.

<sup>98</sup> William J. Bennett, *Why we fight : Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism*, Washington DC: Regnery, 2002, p. 78.

<sup>99</sup> Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding, *Masterminds of terror, the truth behind the most devastating attack the world has ever seen*, New York, Arcade, 2003; David Cortright and George A. Lopez, *Uniting against terror, cooperative nonmilitary responses to the Global terrorist threat*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2007; Ronald Kessler, *The Terrorist Watch, Inside the desperate race to stop the next attack*, New York: Crown Forum, 2007. Ronald Kessler acknowledges the help of FBI assistant for public affairs John Miller. Miller is the one who managed to reach Bin Laden in 1998 and obtain an interview.

<sup>100</sup> Brendon O’Connor and Martin Griffiths, *The Rise of Anti-Americanism*, New York: Routledge, 2005.

The existence of a US “hidden agenda”, behind the ambition of nudging Islam towards western modernity, was acknowledged by the Defense Advisory Board report (2004). The counterterrorism doctrine took it upon itself to target specific constituencies and adversaries on a global scale, trying to play them off against each other and thereby convince moderate group leaders to rally to the cause of modernization and change and reject fundamentalists, presented as violent and immoral.<sup>101</sup> This therefore further exposes some of the flaws in the official narrative for the entire American intervention. Overall, it undermines the legitimacy of its intent to bring its values, ostensibly democracy and freedom, to those regions.

The new doctrine reinstated the ideology of American “truthfulness” at the core of this “narrative of power,” or “regime of truth,” a phrase that Michel Foucault used to describe “a fabricated reality based on the workings and interests of those who constitute and articulate this ‘truth’.”<sup>102</sup> This conceptual approach was almost identical to Harold Lasswell’s own definition of a “total strategy” during World War II.

### ***Integrating all instruments of power***

In the months following the attacks, a convergence of voices in the media shared and promoted similar interpretations, suggesting the need to “go beyond” public diplomacy, and make it operate at the level of military “strategic communication,” an approach now advocated by number of scholars such as William A. Rugh, Keith Reinhard or Peter G. Peterson, who recommend market-corporate procedures as a means to win the war on terror. Tackling the problem from a different perspective, Shaun Riordan, Jan Melissen and the present authors are far more cautious, and stress the shortcomings of such an approach, including problems of authority and control, as well as accountability.

The Pentagon insisted that it be at the core of the integration process, drawing itself more fully into foreign policy activities, seeking to frame events and set agendas by adopting a pre-emptive media posture. The latest Military Doctrine and Strategic Communication documents are aimed at perception management, in other words a PSYOP conducted at the strategic global level. In contrast to information operations, it may be aimed at a global audience and does not need to be associated with a military campaign.<sup>103</sup>

An early attempt at fusing public diplomacy and public affairs was aborted in 2002, when the Pentagon abandoned its Office of Strategic Influence (OSI)

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<sup>101</sup> Efforts have been made to use the horrors attributed to Al Qaeda in local and international media to influence the Muslim public. Eric Smith and Tom Shanker, *Counterstrike, the untold story of America's secret campaign against Al Qaeda*, New York Times Books, 2011.

<sup>102</sup> Joseph H. Campos, *The State and Terrorism, Homeland Security*, Burlington: Ashgate, 2007, p. 121.

<sup>103</sup> According to the Defense Science Board : “The world’s almost instantaneous access to news and information makes it nearly impossible to localize any information campaign” in DSB, report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict, 2000, p.11

project. The leak from inside the Pentagon disclosed such an early trial at exercising “full spectrum capabilities,” with the DOD capable of pursuing its projects through multiple channels. This failure did not dissuade it from planting pro-military narratives and source expertise in news media programs across America and around the Globe through the Internet, until exposed again by the *New York Times* in 2008.<sup>104</sup> The U.S. Army Central Command soon after claimed that it was ready to deploy bloggers over the Internet as it would do with troops on the ground according to their new security doctrine claiming that the battles of the present and near future are of words, narratives and concepts.<sup>105</sup>

Less and Less dissent remains as to the scope and means to be used in order to win this war on terror. Few seem to doubt, for example, that civilians are still in control of the policy making as cogently presented in the words of military historians such as Thomas Owens Mackubin.<sup>106</sup> Many think tanks, including the CSIS, suggest the creation of a nonprofit, nongovernmental institution to pursue public diplomacy efforts. The RAND corporation was elected to conduct a survey of existing reform and improvement proposals, a task it completed in 2008 without tangible results. The 2007 *CSIS Commission on Smart Power* argued that in any case, “maintaining U.S. military power is paramount to any smart power strategy.”<sup>107</sup>

Considering the enormous size of defense spending and the budget allocation to US private contractors and corporations, “what is good for the military seems now also good for America.”<sup>108</sup> The DoD budget and resources far surpass other government departments and agencies. This affects not only the State Department, but also the CIA, as an independent purveyor of strategic information. The DoD now channels 80% of the funding for the intelligence business, thanks to its giant private quasi-civilian network.<sup>109</sup> To assure its continued success, former Army generals are enrolled on a regular basis as University teaching staff, following in the steps of the rehabilitation of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) on campuses, banned since the end of the Vietnam conflict.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> This is confirmed by the paper Michael Doran gave during the 2009 Smith-Mundt Symposium, pleading for the need to “get back to the influence business,” and asking for the US to create networks promoting its strategic interests. See Craig Whitlock, « Somali American caught up in a Shadowy Pentagon counterpropaganda campaign » in *Washington Post*, July 8, 2013.

<sup>105</sup> General Ray Odierno in a conference mediated by Margaret Warner from CSA-PBS Newshour, pleaded for a “complete governmental approach” at the ArmyWar College conference titled « The future of American land power », <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/banner/article.cfm?id=2916>

<sup>106</sup> Thomas Owen Mackubin, *US Civil-military relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain*, New York: Continuum books, 2011.

<sup>107</sup> Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, more secure America*, Washington DC: Center for International and Strategic Studies, 2007.

<sup>108</sup> P.W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors, the rise of the privatized military Industry*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003.

<sup>109</sup> *The Washington Post* recently drew a chart of all these connections, under the title: “Top Secret America.” <http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/>

<sup>110</sup> Elisabeth Bumiller, “After War Room, Heading Ivy League Classroom” in *New York Times*, May 7, 2012, pp.A1,12; see official web site: <http://www.goarmy.com/rotc.html>

Many now implicitly accept the extralegal intelligence and security measures that give the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) created on August 27, 2004 full access to all intelligence assets (NSA, CIA, DIA), acting like a panopticon designed to allow the security establishment to observe all subjects simultaneously.<sup>111</sup> The Strategic Operational Planning (DSOP) within the NCTC illustrates how the military “influences” policy operations and how it has become entitled to integrate all instruments of national power, escaping any scrutiny by Congress or the American people due to its interagency nature.<sup>112</sup> A Global Engagement and Strategic Communication Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) is now under the National Security Council Authority. The long-term strategic planning depends upon the national security staff (NSS). The Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) develops policy guidance, strategic plans, as well as communication themes and narratives for senior leadership.<sup>113</sup>

All this seems to indicate that the Department of State is indeed slowly acquiescing to the standards set by the Pentagon, not so much by ceding all its ground, but by using a military style strategic communications approach. This was evident in the tenure of Karen Hughes, who, at the time of her appointment as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in September 2005, held a Town Hall meeting for State Department employees in which she described her plans to improve the US image abroad in militaristic phrases, outlining a “rapid-response unit” and “forward-deploy regional SWAT teams” to “formulate a more strategic and focused approach to all our public diplomacy assets.”<sup>114</sup> Therefore, if the DoS still provides guidance, it depends on the military command for the long term strategic planning.<sup>115</sup> According to historian Stephen Glain, if “militarization” is taking over many of the traditional diplomacy fields, such as foreign aid programs, it is the civilian elites that are to blame.<sup>116</sup>

Under Obama, government agencies have begun to engage more actively with the blogosphere, exploiting new avenues of influence with the DoS’s “Digital Outreach Team” and the DoD’s “New media operations.” A blueprint is included in the Department of State’s *2010 Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy*, which stresses a change in approach by the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) to take into account the trends towards mobile telephone technologies, social networks, and social media.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> NSA's most recent program of interception, named "Prism," was exposed by Edward Snowden's Security leakage of documents. It confirms the massive and invasive nature of the surveillance still under way.

<sup>112</sup> The Intelligence reform and terrorist prevention act (IRTPA), Executive Order 13354, August 27, 2004

<sup>113</sup> See National Framework for Strategic Communication, at [www.fas.org/man/eprint/pubdip.pdf](http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/pubdip.pdf)

<sup>114</sup> Nancy Snow, « The Resurgence of U.S. Public Diplomacy after 9/11, » in *The Impact of 9/11 on the Media, Arts, and Entertainment. The Day that Changed Everything?* Volume 4. An Interdisciplinary Series of Volumes on the Impact of 9/11. Series editor, Matthew J. Morgan. Chapter 6. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

<sup>115</sup> See Sara B. King, “Military Social Influence in the Global Information Environment: A Civilian Primer” in *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, Vol. 11, No.1, 2011, pp.1-26

<sup>116</sup> Stephen Glain, *op. cit.* p. 407.

<sup>117</sup> <http://www.state.gov/r/iip/>

In June 2011, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) opened a program for the development of a new science of social networks.<sup>118</sup> By the end of 2011, the State Department have already spent some \$70 million on circumvention efforts and related technologies.<sup>119</sup> Libby Liu, head of Radio Free Asia, has confirmed the existence of cross-border technologies used for “subversion.” We are a far cry from the “white,” that is, verified and genuine, communication advocated by the government’s manual. And there is a price for this considerable distance between the cup and the lip: it affects American credibility, and not for the better.

The United States and Israel are not only unwilling to alter their common unilateral approach to terrorism, they intend to sell it to other nations through their networks.<sup>120</sup> Israel has managed to secure the United States’ support through the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC, 1963), the “Conference of Presidents,” the JINSA and WINEP, sustaining the strategic partnership more efficiently than any other lobby through expertise and non-profit channels.<sup>121</sup> The Obama administration has been pressured to keep the former course of action and prevented from engaging in what he promised in Cairo, including the opening towards a fairer policy that responds to the long Palestinian struggle for self-determination.<sup>122</sup> Furthermore, the US government has barely acknowledged the complex reasons behind the so called Islamist upsurge against the tyrants in the Arab Spring, another patent demonstration of the forces of inertia where strategic interests are at stake.<sup>123</sup>

These revolutionary movements were subject to selective “mediatization” inside the United States, with scarce or no reporting about the demonstrations occurring in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain and Israel, all close US allies, and focusing instead on Iran, Syria, and North African countries. When these demonstrations seemed to gain ground on US soil in autumn 2011, coverage came close to disappearing from the mainstream media. The network of expertise played a part in this. The RAND and CSIS specialists produced, almost daily, books and reports on the “new generations” of Al-Qaeda recruits and

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<sup>118</sup> The web, including youtube, and video games. Recent examples show how DC Comics is marketing military products for mass consumption to kids and teenagers. The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Public Affairs Office has actively engaged in the blogosphere in order to reach new publics. Many experts use blogs as a non-transparent source of information.

<sup>119</sup> James Glanz and John Markoff, “U.S. underwrites internet detour around censors,” *The New York Times*, 12.06.11, pp. 1, 8.

<sup>120</sup> John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the name of Islam*, 2002, p. 154; Iyanathul Islam, “Anti-Americanism in the Muslim world, a sceptic’s guide” in O’Connor, Brandon and Martin Griffiths, *The Rise of Anti-Americanism*, 2005, p. 83.

<sup>121</sup> The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) which is non-profit, non partisan organization, published in its latest issue of *The Journal of International Security Affairs*, no 21, Fall-Winter 2011 an account of its Symposium 9/11+10. This mixes criticisms of Obama and accusations against Iran.

<sup>122</sup> The recognition of the Palestinian State by UNESCO, followed by the US withdrawal in October 2011 illustrates the point and has been greatly damaging for the US.

<sup>123</sup> Mark Mazetti and Scott Shane, “Old Arab ties may harm new ones,” *New York Times*, 18.03.11, p. 8.



affiliates after the apparent execution of Al-Qaeda's leader, Bin Laden.<sup>124</sup> No reexamination of the Grand Narrative occurred at this critical time; rather, the specialists produced new “versions” of the crisis discourse, adopting the “Al-Qaeda affiliates” label, which was supposed to demonstrate to the broad public the extraordinary survival ability of the terror network in spite of the loss of its figurehead.<sup>125</sup>

The existence of a classified strategy, “Muslim World Outreach,” that identifies Islam as a national security level challenge encourages misperception and a distorted view of Islam itself. Further inquiries should be made to explain how this fits into the historic ascendancy of Islam as a revolutionary ideology inside the United States. Edward Saïd exposed a long time ago the extent to which strong anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments have affected US policy towards the Middle East in the past.<sup>126</sup> USAID, now working with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), serves as a cover channel for programs targeting American and foreign Muslims.<sup>127</sup> A recent academic report on terrorism prosecution has overtly accused US law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, of manufacturing a “homegrown threat.”<sup>128</sup>

So, in spite of Obama’s willingness to initiate a “new beginning,” as signaled in his Cairo Speech (June 2009), his administration has pursued efforts to deploy a global architecture of “shadow” Internet and mobile phone systems that dissidents can potentially use to undermine their governments. Such projects are aimed at creating lines of communication that are sustained outside official avenues.<sup>129</sup> Although military in nature, the project has profound civilian implications. The concept of “citizen diplomacy” is riding high at the moment, and might well replace a tarnished public diplomacy concept.<sup>130</sup> Because of this, the US Army claims its share in the exercise of “citizen diplomacy” through its forces on the ground, using new regional models of interagency integration that continue to be tested in Africa since 2007.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Catherine Herridge, “Al Qaeda 2.0 behind fresh 9/11 terror threat?”; CSIS website advertising the book : *The future of Al Qaeda and Associated movements (AQIM)*

<http://www.csis.org/publication/confronting-uncertain-threat>

<sup>125</sup> For a detailed analysis of the crisis discourse see Stuart Croft, *Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror*, Boston, Cambridge University Press, 2006

<sup>126</sup> Nancy Snow, *Propaganda Inc.*, *op. cit.*, p.17.

<sup>127</sup> Karen DeYoung in 2009 Smith-Mundt Symposium, Panel 2 “America’s bifurcated engagement.”

<sup>128</sup> “Targeted and entrapped, manufacturing the Homegrown threat in the United States,” Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York, NYU School of Law, 2011.

<sup>129</sup> The “Open technology initiative” is directed by the “New America foundation.”

<sup>130</sup> Intervention by Colonel Christopher Kolenda, “Citizen Diplomacy and the role of the military” at the US Summit and initiative for Global Citizen Diplomacy, The US Center for Citizen Diplomacy, November 17, 2010.

<sup>131</sup> AFRICOM was created in 2007 and it is not excluded that this might be applied to other geographical regions.

### The credibility vs. efficiency issue

The ongoing juridical debate between the DoS and DoD will affect the boundaries within which policy makers will operate in the future.<sup>132</sup> The field of psychological warfare has developed tremendously over the years through military investment. It now includes content analysis, survey research, scaling techniques, diffusion studies, reference group theories, and motivation research. This trend accompanies a gradual disappearance of neat separations between the domestic and international spheres, opening a “netwar” defined as a “mode of conflict at societal levels, short of traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists use the network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age.”<sup>133</sup> A network’s strength depends on five levels of function: organization (design level), narrative (story being told), doctrinal (strategies and methods), technological (information systems in use) and social (personal ties to assure loyalty and trust).<sup>134</sup> Such networks are made of civilians, but are built by and with military technologies, allowing groups to appear leaderless.

All the lessons learned from the advertising industry, however, namely that marketing should be specialized and carefully targeted, that the message should be decoupled from the parent company or source (the government), and that the use of non-verbal symbols is as effective as verbal communication, have failed to overcome the crude reality that the objective seems to be the pursuit of a permanent war.<sup>135</sup> Some critics have pointed to structural deficiencies, following what Richard Arndt called the defeat of the “intellectuals” inside the bureaucratic structure after 1976.<sup>136</sup> Others accused the *Neorealist* politicians of having destroyed the credibility of the United States by entering into damaging alliances with autocrats.<sup>137</sup> Still others blame the neoconservatives for their rigid unilateral doctrinal commitment to military supremacy.

Paul Sharp, Richard Nelson and Foad Izadi have stressed the importance of internal factors in explaining the failure of public diplomacy. According to them, the American public and Congress are not sufficiently informed about US foreign policy actions. The “instrumentalization of truth” contributes to widening the gap between what the government says it is doing and what it really does. Aided by the Internet and the fundamental shift in how people get and consume information, the US should start to recognize that it has no ownership over the concepts of democracy, liberty or freedom, and that it should therefore stop claiming moral superiority. Such a bold step would necessitate a shared

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<sup>132</sup> Charlie Savage, “Obama Adviser discusses using military on terrorists,” *New York Times*, 24.09.11, p. 6.

<sup>133</sup> Ronfeldt and Arquilla, cited in David Martin Jones, *Globalization and the New Terror*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2004, p. 140.

<sup>134</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>135</sup> Peter Van Buren is the most recent example of a former State Department member of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) recounting the failure of public diplomacy efforts in Iraq. Peter Van Buren, *We Means Well, How I helped lose the battle for Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People*, New York, Metropolitan Books, 2011.

<sup>136</sup> R.T. Arndt, *op. cit.*, p. 418.

<sup>137</sup> S. Riordan, *the New Diplomacy*, 2003, p. 36.

commitment to revisiting US national myths as well as a collective education effort.

The problem thus appears to be systemic and dependent on the hegemonic power structure of the US information and culture industries.<sup>138</sup> A former press secretary to George W. Bush called this “the permanent campaign,” a “nonstop process seeking to manipulate sources of public approval.” The locutions themselves indicate that America’s public diplomacy and strategic communication efforts reflect fundamentally domestic aspects of its culture, and thus fail to resonate with foreign audiences.<sup>139</sup> As Michael Mann rightly observed: “the notion of civilian control of the military became meaningless, since civilians were the leading militarists.”<sup>140</sup> Public diplomacy itself was part of a broader operational conception, only describing the civilian facet of a total US strategic effort.<sup>141</sup>

## Conclusion

The process through which the United States government has gradually privatized its functions is impressive. The architecture of this “soft power” or “smart power” as a component of military strategy is undeniably unique, and has served as a support for hard military power since 9/11. However, this evolution has experienced both progress and setbacks.<sup>142</sup>

The psychological warfare concept as a total policy was born in the “think factory” of the Second World War. It was a wartime concept to support wartime aims, and thus was incapable of conjugating transparency and truthfulness in the means deployed to reach these goals.<sup>143</sup> The United States set up an infrastructure of power after the war that gradually expanded research conducted on “psychological operations.” The term “psychological warfare” was itself a cover name to designate a “strategy” that proceeded to integrate all components of policy together, in order to achieve power by coordinating all these elements.

The Vietnam War was a decisive step on this long path because it validated for the military the theory that not only would future wars be fought and won in the civilian arena, but that the army itself must gain control of this civilian battle and not let civilians decide it for them.

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<sup>138</sup> Nancy Snow, *Propaganda Inc.: Selling America's culture to the World*, 2010, p. 54.

<sup>139</sup> Scott McCellan, *What Happened : Inside the Bush White House and Washington's culture of deception*, Washington DC: PublicAffairs, 2008, p. 63.

<sup>140</sup> Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire*, 2003, p. 9. The Defense Department employs today around 700,000 civilians, with a budget of \$700 billion, cut for the first time since World War I to \$525 billion in the 2013 budget.

<sup>141</sup> In Liam Kennedy and Scott Lucas, *op.cit.* p.313

<sup>142</sup> Jérôme Gyax, “Strategic culture and security, American antiterrorist policy and the use of soft power after 9/11”, *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security*, edited by Jussi Hanhimäki, Georges-Henri Soutou and Basil Germond, New York, Routledge, 2010, pp.231-249

<sup>143</sup> Benjamin Goldsmith, “Spinning the Globe? U.S. Public Diplomacy and Foreign Public Opinion,” *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 71, no. 3, July 2009, p. 864.

Over the years, through investment in research, the military has developed not only the necessary networks and the ability to control them, but also a wide array of think tanks and private clients that produce ideas and content and post them on the “seamless” web. It was accepted by psychological experts after the Second World War that influence “followed group dynamics and peer pressure.” Samuel Huntington was prescient when he declared in 1973 that future strategies would have to be designed by the military authorities rather than civilians. As the power to spread and shape messaging shifted to the military, civilian leaders increasingly sought to use and develop that “power” to their advantage. Like the military, they learned to use the CIA to channel their objectives with the help of the JCS. The CIA and DoD find collaborative approaches fruitful in the new paramilitary environment of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.

Yet, throughout these efforts to define “terrorism” as an objective reality, a “truth” congenial to their own identity, US policy makers over the years seem to have been trapped in a dilemma that prevents them from achieving either credibility or efficiency using a deceptive approach.

The opening of a new generation of cultural centers in Jakarta, the capital of the most populated Islamic country, Indonesia, last winter, reflects the new face of US diplomacy, a mere commercial showcase.<sup>144</sup> The Obama administration, despite its good intentions, has missed its opportunity to reevaluate past policies, and has therefore failed to change their course. A June 13, 2012 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey shows that Obama’s median favorability in the Muslim majority countries has dropped from 34% in 2009, the year of his Cairo speech, to 15%. In Pakistan alone, support for Obama (7%) is comparable to President George W. Bush during his last year in office (2008). Much of this disfavor centers on the unpopular military policies such as drone attacks and kill lists now advocated by Obama as a “continuation of the war on terror by other administration means.”<sup>145</sup>

Over the last half century, it seems that the military has become involved not only in policy implementation, but also in policymaking, with a devastating impact on values, and on the US capacity to retain its function as a role model in the long run. For many observers, the US government’s rhetoric and behavior bear a striking resemblance to those of official enemies. RAND has been advocating the use of terror to counter terror for years.<sup>146</sup> For some, the United States is just the mirror image of its enemies, projecting its own “self” on the unknown.<sup>147</sup> All these points combined, from the failure to address specific long-time political problems, to the untruthfulness of these policies and the

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<sup>144</sup> named “@america,” they are run by local commercial representatives. See Norimistu Onishi, “US updates the brand it promotes in Indonesia,” in *New York Times*, 06.03.11, p. 6.

<sup>145</sup> “Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 13, 2012. <http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global-opinion-of-obama-slips-international-policies-faulted/>

<sup>146</sup> Tom H. Hastings *Nonviolent Response to Terrorism*, 2004, p. 178.

<sup>147</sup> Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*, 2002, p. 273 ; Arndt pointed out that the US eventually adopted the same tactics as the Soviets during the Cold War, in Arndt, *op. cit.* p. 456.

misrepresentation of Islam, not to mention the GWOT itself, offer a reasonable explanation for the alleged failure of the American public diplomacy effort gradually replaced by strategic communication paradigm.<sup>148</sup> The situation furthermore confirms a rise of corporate-led military contractors in service to American democracy that risk altering core principles and values and threatening the foundation of America's constitutional premises.<sup>149</sup>

Obama's show of resistance against the military pressures exerted on his policy, notably his announcement of the need to close the post-9/11 era, has been met head on by the CSIS and other upper echelon military speaking through their private media channels.<sup>150</sup> Yet, all attempts to engage in a radical reorganization of power distribution in Washington have so far failed. Even if civilians are still theoretically in charge of policy-making, the policy blueprints and the so-called educational effort seem to lie in the hands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the CIA as its operational arm, in a program designed by and for the interests of the fast expanding National Security Apparatus.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> The so called "terrorist rings" in the United States have been uncovered mostly through entrapment, and members have been charged for the most part under laws of conspiracy and perjury rather than on the basis of any action.

<sup>149</sup> Alex Carey, *Taking the Risk out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda versus Freedom and Liberty*, Sydney: University of NSW Press, 1995.

<sup>150</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman (CSIS) criticized President Obama in Mark Landler and Mark Mazzetti, "For Obama's Global Vision, Daunting Problems" in *NYT*, May 25, 2013; Frank Gaffney as President and Founder of the Center for Security Policy (CSP) former assistant secretary of Defense under Reagan, appear on Glenn Beck show. <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2010/08/24/frank-gaffney-with-glenn-beck-shariah-stealth-jihad-2/> and signing an editorial for the Washington Post, title « Whose side is Obama on ? A pattern of soft-pedaling U.S. response to terrorism prompts questions », April, 30, 2013.

<sup>151</sup> The latest Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA), HR 3523 was sponsored by Mike Rogers, former officer in the US Army and FBI special agent, Chairman of the House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).